THE ROLE OF THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL GUARD IN THE RESPONSE TO NEW TERRORIST THREATS: COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE PREVENTION OF JIHADIST RADICALISATION[1]

O PAPEL DA GUARDA NACIONAL REPUBLICANA FACE ÀS NOVAS AMEAÇAS DO TERRORISMO: O POLICIAMENTO COMUNITÁRIO NA PREVENÇÃO DA RADICALIZAÇÃO JIHADISTA

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Abstract

Radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist groups such as Daesh is a current global security problem and preventing jihadist radicalisation is critical to stop young people from engaging in terrorist activities and becoming a new generation of terrorists. The object of study of this investigation is community policing by the GNR, and the general objective is to determine how the GNR can help prevent jihadist radicalisation through community policing. Thus, the study analyses the role of the GNR in the National Security System from the perspective of terrorism prevention, explains radicalisation processes, describes the European radicalisation prevention programmes, and analyses the role of community policing in preventing criminal phenomena. The research methodology uses inductive reasoning supported by a qualitative research strategy, and the data were collected through documentary analysis of Portuguese and European documents and interviews. The findings showed that the GNR's community policing model makes it uniquely qualified to gather and produce intelligence, which is essential to detect and report cases of radicalisation, and that expert opinions are divided regarding the need for a specific community policing programme to prevent radicalisation.

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[1] Article adapted from the individual research work prepared for the 2018 / 2019 Joint Staff Course. The defence took place in June 2019 at the Military University Institute.

Resumo

A radicalização e recrutamento de indivíduos por parte de grupos terroristas, como o Daesh, é um problema securitário atual e global, sendo a prevenção da radicalização jihadista fundamental para a evitar que os jovens enveredem pelo terrorismo e impedir o aparecimento de uma nova geração de terroristas. Esta investigação tem como objeto de estudo o policiamento comunitário efetuado pela GNR, sendo objetivo geral analisar a forma como a GNR, através do policiamento comunitário, pode contribuir para prevenir a radicalização jihadista. Assim, analisou-se o posicionamento da GNR no Sistema de Segurança Interna, no âmbito da prevenção do Terrorismo, explicou-se os processos de radicalização, descreveram-se programas europeus de prevenção da radicalização e analisou-se o papel do policiamento comunitário enquanto medida de prevenção de fenómenos criminais. A metodologia utilizada assenta no raciocínio indutivo, apoiado numa estratégia qualitativa, baseando-se a recolha de dados na análise documental de fontes nacionais e europeias e no recurso à técnica de entrevista. Concluiu-se que o policiamento comunitário desenvolvido pela GNR resulta numa inigualável capacidade de recolha e produção de informações, essenciais para detetar e sinalizar situações concretas de radicalização, não sendo consensual que a prevenção da radicalização se possa constituir como um programa específico de policiamento comunitário.

Palavras-chave: *Guarda Nacional Republicana, Terrorismo, Radicalização, Prevenção, Policiamento Comunitário.*

1. Introduction

Terrorist attacks, or the threat of such attacks, have been on the global security agenda since 11 September 2001, a date that marked a shift in the security paradigm. It was with this event that the word *jihadism* entered into common usage (Heleno, 2017), bringing Islamist religious terrorism to the forefront of the international stage.

Today, radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist groups is a critical global security problem. *Al Qaeda* and *ad-Dawlat al-Islāmiyah fī al-ʿIrāq wa sh-Shām* (*Daesh*)[2] are the world's best known jihadist terrorist organizations. The radicalisation of foreign fighters (including Portuguese citizens), a process that leads these individuals to adopt violent extremist ideologies, is a well-known phenomenon.

Due to growing concerns, the European Union (EU) has issued several strategic documents, which have been prepared and implemented at European and national level, to combat terrorism and prevent terrorist incidents. These documents include the EU

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[2] Acronym of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, which stands for "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant". The acronym "Daesh" will be used here to remove the symbolic weight from the term "Islamic State". Azeredo Lopes, professor of Public International Law and former Minister of National Defence, argues that an organization that essentially exists to destroy us should not be given the status of "State", the noblest statute recognised by international law, nor described as "Islamic", a culture that is not represented by what amounts to a group of bandits, murderers and terrorists (Baldaia, 2015).

Counter-Terrorism Strategy (EUCTS) and the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NCTS). The EU has also adopted a strategy to combat radicalisation and recruitment (the Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism) in order to prevent young people from engaging in terrorism and becoming a new generation of terrorists (EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005).

Based on European law, the NCTS sets out guidelines for the mobilisation, coordination and cooperation of all national structures responsible for combating terrorism. One of the pillars of the NCTS is "Prevent", which implies "knowing and identifying the causes that determine the emergence of processes of radicalisation, recruitment and terrorist acts" (Resolution of the Council of Ministers no. 7-A/2015 of 19 February 2015, pp.1022-(2)).

The Portuguese National Security System (NSS) and the Security Forces and Services (SFS) that comprise it play an integral role in achieving this goal. According to Valente (2013, p.58), the "national security activities of the SFS consist in preventing acts that endanger national security". Therefore, preventing the radicalisation and recruitment of new terrorists fits the definition perfectly.

The National Republican Guard (GNR) is a security force that integrates the NSS and is responsible for policing much of the national territory, in areas of high social inequality, therefore it is particularly well-prepared to prevent criminal phenomena. According to Pires (2016, p.44) "terrorism and jihadist radicalism usually thrive in permissive milieus where social inequalities abound or where there are high rates of unemployment". Therefore, by serving the population in a close, humane and reliable manner, the GNR can play an important role in preventing jihadist radicalisation.

In 2018, thanks to this relationship of proximity and trust with the community, the GNR began implementing its Community Policing model (GNR, 2018). The model has had positive results in terms of criminal prevention, and several authors have emphasised its potential as a tool of terrorism prevention (Gomes, 2017).

Although Daesh's pseudo-caliphate has been practically dismantled, the current lull in terrorist activity is certainly a temporary reprieve forced by a much more powerful military coalition, and a new terrorist wave led by someone willing to commit jihadist terrorism is likely to emerge at any moment (Villaverde, 2018).

In March 2018, the Central Department of Criminal Investigation and Penal Action prosecuted a person affiliated with Daesh who had been engaging in jihadist radicalisation and recruitment of young Moroccans in Portugal at the Reception Centre for Refugees, which demonstrates that the phenomenon of jihadist radicalisation is very much a reality in Portugal. Furthermore, the dismantling of Daesh may lead to the return of Portuguese citizens directly involved in jihadist activity (Lusa, 2019).

Thus, the issue of jihadist radicalisation is both relevant and current and must be closely monitored.

The object of study of this investigation is the community policing carried out by the GNR as a measure to prevent jihadist radicalisation.

The study will be delimited in terms of time, space and content (Santos & Lima, 2016). In terms of time, to the period from 11 September 2001 to the present day, as it was since that

moment that jihadist terrorism appeared in the international security landscape. In terms of space, to the Portuguese territory, which is where the GNR carries out its activities. In terms of content, to the role of the GNR in the Portuguese NSS and the community policing activities it carries out in Portugal, underpinned by European prevention strategies.

The general objective (GO) of this investigation is *To determine how the GNR can help prevent jihadist radicalisation through community policing*.

To achieve the general objective, it was first necessary to accomplish the following specific objectives (SO):

SO1 - To analyse the GNR's role in preventing terrorism as part of the Portuguese National Security System;

SO2 - To analyse jihadist radicalisation processes in the West;

SO3 - To examine the European Union's jihadist radicalisation prevention programmes;

SO4 - To analyse the role of community policing in preventing criminal phenomena among minorities.

The study's research question (RQ) is: "How can the GNR help prevent jihadist radicalisation in Portugal through community policing?"

2. Theoretical and conceptual framework

This chapter contains the concepts drawn from the literature review, provides a contextual and conceptual basis for the research, and presents the analysis model.

2.1. Literature review and conceptual basis

2.1.1. National Security System

The Portuguese national security system "is the result of successive structural and temporary reformulations and adaptations, which aimed to implement various public security policies and facilitate coordination among the different actors that integrate the NSS, which essentially aims to guarantee the security of the State and of its citizens." (Matos, 2016, p. 71)

Article 272(1) of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (2013) states that the Police is responsible for "defending democratic legality and protecting national security and the rights of Portuguese citizens". The National Security Law (NSL) (Law 53/2008 of 29 August 2008) sets out principles and goals pertaining to national security, including how it will be implemented, and defines the forces and services which are tasked with security functions.

The measures provided for in the NSL "specifically aim to protect people's lives and integrity, public peace and democratic order against threats such as terrorism (…)" (Article 1 (1)(3) of the NSL).

The NSF with national security functions are the GNR, the Public Security Police (PSP), the Judiciary Police (PJ), the Foreigners and Borders Service (SEF) and the Internal Intelligence Service (SIS) (Article 25 (2) of the NSL).

The architecture of the NSS is outlined in the NSL and includes the following bodies: the High Council of Internal Security (CSSI), the Secretary General (SG-SSI) and the Security Coordination Cabinet (GCS) (Art. 11 of the NSL), which answer directly to the Prime Minister (PM).

The GNR is represented by its Commandant-General at the CSSI and the GCS, and is therefore an integral and fundamental part of the NSS with legally assigned responsibilities.

The NSS was reinforced with the establishment of the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit (UCAT) on 25 February 2003, by Order of the PM, as provided for in Article 23 of the NSL.

As provided for in Article 23(7) of the NSL, Regulatory Decree No. 2/2016 of 23 August regulated the organization and operation of the UCAT, a body composed of representatives from various entities, including a representative of the Commandant-General of the GNR.

The SFS, which include the GNR, are the executive bodies of the NSS tasked with ensuring that the rights, freedoms and guarantees of citizens are respected. For Valente (2013, p.58), the "national security activities of the SFS consist of preventing acts that endanger the national security".

As defined in the Organic Law on the GNR (LOGNR) (Law No. 63/2007 of 6 November, p. 8043), the GNR "is a military security force staffed by military personnel organized in a special corps of forces" whose "mission, as part of the national security and protection system, is to ensure democratic legality, to safeguard the national security and citizens' rights, and to collaborate in the implementation of the defence policy as defined by the Constitution and the law".

The GNR is tasked with "preventing crime in coordination with the other security forces and services" (Art. 3 (1) (c) of LOGNR). The GNR is responsible for policing about 94% of the national territory (86,597.4 Km2), which is home to about 53.8% of the Portuguese population (5,756,027 people) (GNR, 2017). As such, it has "access to a wealth of information that, once processed, integrated and analysed, can be used to support decision making in the prevention, response and management of terrorist incidents" (Matos, 2016). Therefore, it is uniquely prepared to prevent the occurrence of criminal phenomena, including those linked to terrorism.

The GNR is, then, a security force that integrates the Portuguese NSS, which is represented in its governing bodies (the CSSI and the GCS) and in the UCAT, and is therefore qualified to carry out terrorism prevention activities.

2.1.2. Terrorism

There are several definitions of terrorism, none of which cover all the varieties of terrorism that have emerged throughout history (Laqueur, 2012, p.7).

The United Nations (UN) describes terrorism as criminal acts, including those against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, which are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature (UN, 2004).

In Article 1 of its Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002, the EU defines terrorist offenses as:

> [...] intentional acts that [...] given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation. (Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June, p.4)

In the Portuguese context, Article 2 of the Terrorism Law (Law No. 52/2003 of 22 August) defines terrorist acts as those that:

> [...] aim to undermine the national integrity and independence; prevent, alter or subvert the operation of the State institutions provided for in the Constitution; compel the public authorities to perform, abstain from performing, or tolerate any act; or to intimidate particular persons, group of persons or the general public. (Law No. 52/2003 of 22 August 2013)

The present investigation focuses on so-called Islamic terrorism, which is also known as jihadist-Salafism because "the political extremists who believe in the righteousness of their cause refer to their terrorist or guerrilla warfare as jihad" (Elias, 2010, p.71).

After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the word *jihad* entered everyday usage. The root *j-h-d,* from which it originates, has the general meaning of "effort" or "struggle". In religious contexts, *jihad* can mean a struggle against temptation ("heart jihad", "soul jihad"), and it can also have the meaning of defending morality ("enjoining the good and forbidding the evil"). The concept of jihad developed by Islamic jurists is that of "spiritual warfare" (jihad in God's way)" (Cherem, 2013).

The jihadist movement comprises different groups of Muslims: Islamists (a term used to define Islamic social or political activists who are fully committed to their ideological view of Islam and the State (Esposito, 2003), that is, they seek to Islamise their social, political and economic environment (Sfeir, 2007); Islamites (Muslims who want to impose Islamic law as the main source of state law and wish to assert their own cultural identity); Salafists (Sunni Muslims who want to establish and rule an Islamic state but do not advocate violence to achieve their desire for a state governed by Islamic law); and jihadists ("holy warriors", terrorists who are part of the Salafi movement but who strongly advocate violence) (Silva, 2015).

Jihadism is, then, the designation given to "Sunni Muslims who use violence to enforce their policies" (Duarte, 2015). Benichou, Khosrokhavar and Migaux (2015) describe jihadism as an extremist ideology explicitly inspired by Islam, which uses this religion to legitimise acts of violence.

The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) issued by Europol describes "jihadist terrorism" as "terror inflicted by groups and individuals who, based on selectively sampled holy texts, mythologised historical examples, conspiracy theories, prejudice [...] anti-western sentiments, anti-Semitism and homophobia, commit crimes against the general population, including fellow Muslims, in the name of Islam" (Europol, 2016). Such jihadist terrorist organizations include Al Qaeda and Daesh, which are responsible for recent phenomena of radicalisation of foreign fighters.

2.1.3. Radicalisation prevention programmes

Before proceeding with the study, the concept of "radicalisation" must be addressed. Radicalisation does not only refer to "religious" terrorism and there is no universally accepted definition of the term (Schmid, 2013).

The phenomenon of jihadist radicalisation has become increasingly relevant in Europe since the attacks on Madrid (2004) and London (2005).

Jihadist radicalisation can be described as a:

> … […] process in which a group / person goes through ideological and / or behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles and demand socio-political, socioeconomic and cultural change, using violence to achieve political goals, if necessary. (Ashour, 2009, cited in Costa & Pinto, 2012)

A narrower definition of the concept describes it as the "process by which Muslims engage in terrorist activities, the operative factor being the intention and ability to participate in such acts" (Costa & Pinto, 2012).

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) defines terrorist radicalisation as the "process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action" (OSCE, 2014).

On the other hand, violent radicalisation is "the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism" (CoPPRa, 2013).

2.1.3.1. Radicalisation processes

Radicalisation is a complex and dynamic process influenced by multiple causes and factors, and is therefore heterogeneous and varies from person to person (Faria, 2013). There are multiple pathways to radicalisation, which can be independent but are generally mutually reinforcing (Oct, 2013).

Radicalisation usually happens to people who are frustrated with their lives, with society or with their governments' policies. However, to explain the emergence of young Muslims (both men and women) willing to carry out terrorist attacks, killing others and even themselves in the process, one must look to a combination of factors (Precht, 2007).

There are numerous conceptual models that attempt to explain the radicalisation process, defining it according to its different stages and characteristics. Moghaddam (2005) explains the radicalisation process using the metaphor of a staircase in a six-floor building, in which the top floor corresponds to terrorist acts. Sageman's radicalisation model (2007) consists of four pillars, which are neither the stages of a process nor do they occur sequentially. Silber and Bhatt's (2007) model establishes four distinct stages, each corresponding to specific features of the radicalisation process. Finally, Wiktorowicz's model (2004) identifies four key processes that increase the likelihood of an individual being drawn to a radical Islamic group and being persuaded to become involved.

Table 1 briefly explains the phases of these conceptual models.

Table 1 – Radicalisation models

MODELOS	FASES
Modelo de Moghadam	(i) Ground floor: unhappy people in society climb to the first floor looking for solutions; (ii) First floor: they try to improve their conditions and achieve justice; (iii) Second floor: those who are still angry and frustrated are influenced by leaders to shift their aggression to an "enemy"; (iv) Third floor: they begin to see terrorism as a legitimate strategy and those who are more committed to the morals preached by terrorist organizations are ready to be recruited to terrorism; (v) Fourth floor: they become members of a terrorist organization that they see as legitimate; (vi) Fifth floor: some recruits are selected, trained, equipped, and sent to perform terrorist acts (Moghaddam, 2005).
Modelo de Sageman	(i) First pillar: experiencing a sense of moral outrage against a situation or event that they see as unjust (e.g. the humiliation of Muslims in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo) and which must be set right; (ii) Second pillar: young people interpret global inequities as a sign that Islam is under threat and must be defended; (iii) Third pillar: a particular personal event (e.g. death of a family member, becoming unemployed) gives personal meaning to their moral outrage and makes them see an attack on Islam as an attack on themselves; (iv) Fourth pillar: joining a jihadist terrorist group (Sageman, 2007).
Modelo de Silber e Bhatt	(i) Pre-radicalisation: describes an individual's world, noting that there are common facilitating factors and traits in those who embrace Jihadist-Salafist Islamic ideology (e.g., young, middle-class Muslims, employed, without a criminal record); (ii) Self-identification: the individual moves away from their former identity and begins a "religious seeking", becoming more receptive to new worldviews; (iii) Indoctrination: the individual fully adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and accepts the political-religious view that justifies and legitimises violence against non-Islamists; (iv) Jihadisation: the individual joins a radical group and accepts their individual duty to participate in jihad (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).
Modelo de Wiktorowicz	(i) Cognitive opening: the individual becomes receptive to the possibility of new ideas and worldviews as a result of a crisis; (ii) Religious seeking: the individual seeks meaning through a religious idiom, such as the ideas espoused by an Islamist group; (iii) Frame alignment: the public representation proffered by the radical group "makes sense" to the individual and attracts their interest, after which their identity is redefined according to an "Islamic identity"; (iv) Socialisation: the individual experiences religious lessons and activities that facilitate indoctrination, changes his or her values and internalises the ideology of the group (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

2.1.3.2. European Union Radicalisation Prevention Programmes

The EUCTS affirms the EU's strategic commitment to combatting global terrorism and ensuring a safer Europe, a goal supported by four pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. The "prevent" pillar aims to "prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes of radicalisation and recruitment, in Europe and internationally" (Note 14469/4/05, 2005, p.03). This entails defining priorities such as common approaches to detect and combat incitement and recruitment in key areas such as prisons, schools or places of worship (Note 14469/4/05, 2005, p.9).

On 4 June 2014, the EU issued its Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, which aims to "prevent people from becoming radicalised, being radicalised and being recruited to terrorism" (Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and

Recruitment to Terrorism, 2014, p.3).

However, traditional police techniques have proved insufficient to tackle the current radicalisation trends, and a broader, society-wide approach is needed to prevent and combat radicalisation (EC, 2014).

The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) has helped the European Commission (EC) identify several areas that Member States and the EU can integrate into their efforts to fight radicalisation at both national and international level, such as consolidating expertise and best practices in radicalisation prevention, and training professionals, such as social workers, teachers, health professionals, police, prison staff and probation officers, to prevent radicalisation (EC, 2014, pp.4-7).

The RAN was established in 2011 as a network of experts in the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism around Europe. It consists of front line practitioners (police and prison authorities, teachers, civilian representatives, representatives of local authorities and health professionals) who work daily with those who have already been radicalised or who are vulnerable to radicalisation (European Commission, 2018).

The RAN is divided into two main structures: the RAN Centre of Excellence (RAN CE) and the RAN Working Groups (RAN WG).

The RAN CE acts as a hub for connecting, developing and disseminating expertise. It supports and coordinates the RAN, helps shape the EC's research agenda, and coordinates with those implementing "prevention" initiatives within and outside the EU. The RG WG hold thematic meetings where experts, academics, and professionals who deal with at-risk groups on a daily basis exchange knowledge, experience and ideas on radicalisation prevention (European Commission, 2018).

The RAN WG consist of nine thematic working groups (cfr. Appendix B), including a specific group for security forces. The Police and Law Enforcement Working Group (RAN POL) focuses on the role of the SFS in preventing radicalisation through community partnerships and by gaining public trust. This working group has issued several publications that aim to demonstrate that community policing is crucial to prevent radicalisation. One of those publications is the "Guide on Training Programmes for Police Officers in Europe", which identifies core competences that require training and that correspond to eight different training programmes that should be in the curriculum for police: training programmes on radicalisation; community policing; intercultural sensitivities, "policing for all" and human rights; multi / interagency cooperation; polarisation and social tensions; the use of internet and social media to prevent radicalisation; effective personal communication; and the police's role in deradicalisation or disengagement of extremist individuals (Lenos & Keltjens, 2016).

These training programmes aim to teach police officers how to recognise the first signs of radicalisation and how to play an instrumental role in preventing them.

More specifically, during the Belgian EU Presidency in 2010, the Community Policing and the Prevention of Radicalisation & Terrorism (CoPPRa) project was set up, covering three areas of activity: to develop a practical and user-friendly tool to support front line police officers in detecting the first signs of radicalisation; developing a common curriculum to train front line police officers on how to use the tool in their daily work; and collaborating

closely with local partners to identify and exchange good practices on how to stop the spread of radicalisation (CoPPRa, 2013).

This project resulted in the elaboration of a manual for trainers and a pocket manual to help first liners detect early signs of radicalisation. The purpose was two-fold: to help first line officers and community policing professionals recognise signs of radicalisation and collect intelligence from the community to prevent the spread of violent radical ideas; and to increase their ability to build relationships and partnerships with local communities and use community policing to prevent radicalisation and terrorism (CoPPRa, 2013).

The CoPPRa project is based on the assumption that regular front line officers – community police – play an important role in preventing radicalisation because they work on the streets, and therefore know and understand their local communities and tend to have good relations with them. This makes them well-equipped to detect the signs of radicalisation at an early stage and work in partnership with local communities to prevent or tackle it (Oct, 2013).

2.1.4. Community policing

Portugal's first policing model was called "proximity policing". In 2018, the GNR began to carry out "Community Policing". Despite their different names, both models have a similar focus on cooperative relations between the police and the public and on increasing empathy and trust between law enforcement agents and citizens.

Although it is not easy to define with precision, community policing refers to police engagement with the community by restructuring police organizations and changing the daily activities of operational police officers (Segrave & Ratcliffe, 2004). It can be defined as a philosophy and organizational strategy that promotes collaboration between the police and the community to more effectively and efficiently identify, prevent and solve problems of crime and social disorder in order to improve the quality of life for everyone (OSCE, 2014).

Community policing is an organizational strategy that requires close interaction between the police and the public to establish policing priorities (Casey, 2010). Its central goal is to encourage the community to participate in enhancing safety and in solving community-related crime because the police cannot do this task on their own (CoPPRa, 2013).

Therefore, the police must be more integrated in the community, strengthen its legitimacy through policing by consent, and improve its services to the public. To be more effective in their prevention activities, the SFS must increase their visibility and their ability to participate in community life, know and be known by citizens, listen to their concerns and address their needs (CoPPRa, 2013).

Community policing is based on the key principles that police must: be visible and accessible to the public; know and be known by the public; engage and set up partnerships with communities; listen to community concerns; respond to the needs of communities; and be accountable for its actions and the consequences of those actions (CoPPRa, 2013).

Community policing is an important strategic complement to traditional policing practices, which focuses on setting up partnerships between the police and the public in which the entire police organization, all government agencies, and communities actively cooperate in solving problems (OSCE, 2014, p.75).

2.1.5. Criminal phenomena

"Due to the fast pace of globalisation, the world's boundaries have become permeable to the movement of persons, goods and capital, and the technologies that facilitate communication and opportunities raise concerns due to their potential for use in criminal phenomena." (Duarte T., 2013, p.25).

Those "criminal phenomena are terrorism, transnational organised crime, radicalism (be it ethnic, religious, nationalist or any other type), illegal immigration, human trafficking, the scramble for natural resources, environmental degradation, pandemics, among other new threats and risks which affect all countries, communities and states" (Duarte T., 2013, p.26).

Articles 2(a) and 3(a) of the Framework Law on Criminal Policy state that terrorism is a criminal phenomenon that must be urgently prevented and investigated (Law No. 96/2017 of 23 August 2017).

Over the last decades, criminal phenomena have changed and become increasingly complex, opaque and, thus immune to intervention from formal control bodies (Simões, 2003).

Community policing can aid in preventing criminal phenomena because:

(i)   It mobilises and empowers communities to identify and respond to their own concerns, and contributes to reduce those problems and issues of concern as they are prioritised and addressed (Segrave & Ratcliffe, 2004);

(ii)   It improves the relationship between the police and the public and increases the public's trust in the police (Segrave & Ratcliffe, 2004);

(iii)   It increases the police's credibility and legitimacy through greater transparency and accountability of the police's actions towards communities (OSCE, 2014);

(iv)   It improves the local physical and social environment and increases positive community attitudes towards the police (Segrave & Ratcliffe, 2004);

(v)   It increases the information, in terms of quantity, quality and diversity that is provided voluntarily by members of the public in support of police action (OSCE, 2014).

Terrorism is a criminal phenomenon; as such community policing can help prevent it in several ways:

(i)   By promoting policing that respects human rights and the rule of law and avoiding discriminatory actions by the police based on religious or racial profiling, as this hinders the integration of the most vulnerable immigrant communities, who could be sources of intelligence on terrorist actions and radicalised individuals or cells (Shafir, Brysk, & Wehrenfennig, 2007);

(ii)   By improving the public's acceptance of police intervention and the relationship between the public and the police, and by enabling police-community partnerships to rebuild citizens' trust and gain access to critical intelligence from local communities (Lyons, 2002);

(iii)   By improving communication with the public on issues pertaining to terrorism to raise awareness in communities regarding the threat of terrorism (Edwards, Jeffray, & Pantucci, 2015);

(iv)   By increasing community cohesiveness and resilience since police-community partnerships foster tolerance and make people less likely to embrace violent extremism and terrorist ideologies (Edwards, Jeffray, & Pantucci, 2015);

(v)   By facilitating the timely identification and referral of critical situations, as community

police are uniquely positioned to identify and tackle emerging critical situations, including concerns that a person might be vulnerable to violent extremism and terrorist recruitment (OSCE, 2014);

Police officers meet numerous people in different situations every day. During those encounters they may see something that could indicate that someone is becoming radicalised, radicalising others, or that a violent or even terrorist activity is being planned or prepared. They may encounter these warning signs while conducting a traffic stop, a house search, interviews, surveillance, or simply while engaging with the community. While performing their everyday work, first line officers may be the first to be confronted with the signs and indicators of violent radicalisation.

It is crucial that all police officers be aware that their observations and reports can make a difference. Knowing how to recognise these early warning indicators and how to respond to them could help prevent an act of terrorism or prevent a person from becoming radicalised. Therefore, first line police officers must be able to interpret and contextualise what they see and hear in their communities according to specific indicators to identify and report any dangerous or suspicious activities (Oct, 2013).

The "community policing carried out by SF such as the GNR can help prevent the criminal phenomenon of radicalisation, which can lead to the emergence of violent extremist ideologies such as terrorism in our country" (Copeto, 2018).

This "type of policing is especially important in communities that have traditionally been more resistant and distrustful of state authorities, where Community Policing is expected to increase the resilience of these communities to extremist ideologies and make them less vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism" (Copeto, 2018).

Community Policing "as a tool to prevent radicalisation can be described by three fundamental principles: emphasis on partnerships with community organizations and leaders, including young people, women, religious groups and ethnic minorities, as well as businesses and other civil society institutions, with which the SF should seek to build a relationship of trust and proximity; problem-solving, which implies that the SF should hear and tackle community concerns and needs, even when they are not a priority for the police; and Community Policing should be proactive and preventive in mobilising the public to address the problem before it evolves into a crime" (Copeto, 2018).

Community policing increases citizens' trust in SF and plays a role in preventing radicalisation and terrorism. This makes Community Policing an essential tool which the police can use to prevent and anticipate radicalisation phenomena by acting on the symptoms and avoiding the negative effects.

2.2. Analysis model

This study was developed according to the concept map shown in Table 2.

Table 2 – Analysis model

General Objective	To determine how the GNR can help prevent jihadist radicalisation through community policing.			
Specific Objectives	**Research Question**	How can the GNR help prevent jihadist radicalisation through community policing?		
	Subsidiary Questions	**Concepts**	**Dimensions**	**Indicators**
SO1 To analyse the GNR's role in preventing terrorism as part of the Portuguese National Security System	**SQ1** What is the GNR's role in preventing terrorism as part of the Portuguese National Security System?	National Security System	National Security System	Legal framework
SO2 To analyse jihadist radicalisation processes in the West	**SQ2** How do jihadist radicalisation processes develop in the West?	Radicalisation	Global	Channels of communication; Radicalisation stages
SO3 To examine the European Union's jihadist radicalisation prevention programme	**SQ3** What are the European Union's jihadist radicalisation prevention programmes?	Programmes; Prevention; Radicalisation	European Union	RAN POL; CoPPRa; National
SO4 To analyse the role of community policing in preventing criminal phenomena among minorities	**SQ4** What is the role of community policing in preventing criminal phenomena among minorities?	Community Policing; Prevention; Criminal Phenomena	National	Reporting signs of criminal phenomena; Intelligence

3. Methodology and method

This chapter describes the methodology and methods used in this investigation.

3.1. Methodology

The study used an inductive reasoning methodology supported by a qualitative research strategy and a case study research design (Santos & Lima, 2016, p. 20).

The methodology was developed in three distinct stages: an exploratory phase (reviewing the literature, conducting exploratory interviews, and preparing the analysis map), an analytical phase (collecting data from document analysis and semi-structured interviews), and a conclusive phase (conclusions, contributions to knowledge, limitations, future studies and recommendations) (Santos & Lima, 2016, p.20).

3.2. Method

This subchapter describes the participants, the procedure, the data collection instruments, and the data processing techniques.

3.2.1. Participants and procedure

Participants: The study sample included 14 experts with professional and academic experience (present or past) in the GNR, the PSP, and in the areas covered in this work, as well as technical expertise in Terrorism and Community Policing.

Procedure: A non-probabilistic and intentional sample of interviewees was selected (Santos & Lima, 2016), and in January 2019 an email with a Letter of Presentation was sent to prospective participants, accompanied by the script of the semi-structured interview and informing them of the purpose of both the questionnaire and the study. The answers to the interview questions were returned via email between January and March 2019, according to the participants' availability.

3.2.2. Data collection instruments

Table 3 contains the script of the semi-structured interview.

Table 3 - Interview Questions

1.   What is the GNR's role in preventing terrorism as part of the National Security System (NSS)?
2.   Do you think that some communities are more vulnerable to radicalisation?   3.   In a given community, what are types of people do you consider to be most at risk of radicalising?   4.   How would you rate the level of risk of radicalisation in Portugal?
5.   Does Portugal have a radicalisation prevention programme?   6.   Do you think Portugal needs a radicalisation prevention programme tailored to the Security Forces?
7.   What are the benefits of community policing in preventing criminal phenomena?   8.   Do you think that community policing can help prevent radicalisation phenomena?   9.   Do you think that radicalisation prevention can be a specific community policing programme?

3.2.3. Data processing techniques

The data obtained from the interviews were analysed according to the steps advised by Guerra (2006): transcription, reading, summarising, descriptive analysis, and interpretative analysis.

The answers to the questions were interpreted using both quantitative analysis (to identify the relative weights of each answer segment) and qualitative analysis, which involved systematising the excerpts of the respondents' answers that were deemed relevant for each question and answer segment to identify commonalities between the answers.

4. Data presentation and discussion of results

This chapter will present and analyse the results of the fieldwork, that is, the interviews conducted with the non-probabilistic and intentional sample of respondents (Santos & Lima, 2016, p.20).

4.1. The role of the GNR in preventing terrorism as part of the Portuguese National Security System

The answer to SQ1 – "What is the GNR's role in preventing terrorism as part of the National Security System?" – was obtained by analysing the current Portuguese NSS and the legal documents that regulate it.

Regarding the relevance of the GNR in preventing terrorism as part of the NSS, three key aspects were mentioned: that it can help prevent the phenomenon (42%), that it has a crucial role in acquiring intelligence (29%), and that the GNR is a military security force, which makes it uniquely qualified (29%). These results confirm the arguments put forth by Matos (2016), who states that the GNR has access to a wealth of information that, once processed, integrated and analysed, can help prevent terrorist incidents.

The GNR is a security force that integrates the NSS, whose national security activities include protecting people's lives and integrity, public peace and democratic order against threats such as terrorism. The GNR is represented at the governing bodies of the NSS (the CSSI and the GCS) and at UCAT, as such it is qualified to perform terrorism prevention activities. Furthermore, the GNR's area of activity covers a large part of the national territory, which gives it access to a wealth of information that, once processed, integrated and analysed, can be used to prevent terrorist incidents. Therefore, the GNR plays a key role in preventing terrorism due to its ability to acquire intelligence related to the phenomenon.

4.2. Jihadist radicalisation processes in the West

The answer to SQ2 – "How do jihadist radicalisation processes develop in the West??" – was obtained by analysing existing models that reflect the current knowledge about radicalisation processes.

A point of agreement is that some communities are more vulnerable to radicalisation, especially jihadist radicalisation. These communities are socially, culturally and economically fragile (42%), isolated (21%) and Muslim (21%).

The respondents tend to agree on the fact that jihadist radicalisation is a process that happens to Muslim individuals, which is in line with the radicalisation models proposed by Sageman, Wiktorowicz, and Silber and Bhatt. The latter (Silber & Bhatt, 2007) go so far as to argue that one of the factors that facilitate radicalisation processes is the existence of enclaves of ethnic Muslim populations.

On the other hand, Wiktorowicz (2004) argues that cognitive opening, which makes a person more receptive to radicalisation, is associated with fragile economic environments, social and political discontent, and various types of discrimination.

Although it is difficult to establish a pattern, there are people who are more vulnerable to radicalisation in any community, such as those who are discriminated within their own communities (35%) and those who are frustrated with life or society (20%).

The respondents' answers are in line with the authors analysed in the literature review. For Silber and Bhatt (2007), those people are young (aged 15-35), Muslim, and unemployed. Precht (2007) and Silber and Bhatt (2007) also argue that radicalisation often happens to people who are frustrated with their lives or society and are socially discriminated.

The fact that there were multiple answer choices reflects the fact that it is difficult to establish a consistent profile of radicalised individuals (Faria, 2013). This confirms Soares's opinion (email interview, 20 February 2019), who states that there are no "profiles that help us predict what kind of individuals are most likely to become radicalised."

On the other hand, "terrorism profiling is not currently used as an approach to deal with

terrorist threats" (Graça, email interview, 19 February 2019). This may be due to the difficulty in profiling individuals who are more likely to become radicalised or commit terrorist acts.

The respondents classified the risk of radicalisation in Portugal as low (57%) or moderate (29%), that is, it is not a common phenomenon.

However, "[…] we cannot assume that Portugal is immune to the phenomenon of jihadist radicalisation" (Soares, op. cit.), as this "assessment […] could lead us to disregard the phenomenon" (Silva, op. cit.), which could have a negative impact on prevention.

Radicalisation usually happens to people who are dissatisfied with their lives or with society, which can lead them to a "religious seeking" for meaning in their lives, which they find in the jihadist-Salafi ideology. After accepting the political and religious ideology that justifies and legitimises violence against non-believers, the person changes his or her values, accepts their personal duty to participate in *jihad*, and joins a jihadist terrorist group that provides them training and equipment and sends them to carry out terrorist acts. While there is no credible profile of the individuals who are more likely to be radicalised, many of them are young (15-35 years old), male, Muslim, unemployed, are discriminated in their communities, and come from isolated communities with poor social, cultural and economic conditions.

4.3. European programmes to prevent jihadist radicalisation

The answer to SQ3 – "What are the European Union's jihadist radicalisation prevention programmes?" – was obtained by analysing and describing two important programmes which define the scope of action of the security forces: the RAN POL and the CoPPRa Programme. These programmes address the role of the NSF in preventing radicalisation through the community policing model, and are based on the principle that first responders have an important role to play in this area. To that end, manuals and training curricula were developed to help first line police officers recognise the early signs of radicalisation and collect intelligence from the community to prevent the spread of violent radicalisation ideas, as well as to increase their capacity to build relationships and set up partnerships with local communities, that is, to prevent radicalisation and terrorism through community policing.

Most respondents (58%) were unaware of the existence of radicalisation prevention programmes in Portugal. However, one respondent referred to the *Plano de Ação de Prevenção da Radicalização e dos Extremismos Violentos e do Recrutamento para o Terrorismo* [Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism and Recruitment to Terrorism] (PAPREVRT), stating that it "falls under the NCTS PREVENT goal, and that it is the first stage of a process aimed at knowing and identifying the causes and agents of terrorism that may emerge in a given geographical space, and in a given political, economic, social or cultural context, to prevent and anticipate the efforts to mobilise persons to commit terrorist acts" (Graça, op. cit.). The PAPREVRT is now ready (Bessa, email interview, 25 February 2019) but the measures that comprise it are still being implemented.

The opinions of the interviewed experts are divided regarding Portugal's need for a radicalisation prevention programme. Some respondents argue that this type of programme is unnecessary because the SFS already have the necessary appropriate knowledge to

disseminate to their staff (Bessa, op. cit.); others believe that a more comprehensive radicalisation prevention programme is needed (Silva, op. cit.) to engage civil society and increase the linkages between it and the SFS.

The EC recognises the need for a more global prevention programme (2014), stating that a broader, society-wide approach is needed to prevent and combat radicalisation. The RAN and the different RG WG also support the idea of a broader response to radicalisation phenomena.

However, 50% of experts argue that a specific programme should be prepared for the SFS. The CoPPRa programme (2013) demonstrates that the SFS could benefit from a specific prevention programme to train first line police officers to detect the early signs of radicalisation.

4.4. The role of community policing in preventing criminal phenomena among minorities

The answer to SQ4 – "What is the role of community policing in preventing criminal phenomena among minorities?" – was obtained by analysing the benefits of the community policing model for the prevention of criminal phenomena. The community policing model: (i) allows for greater community engagement in addressing their own security issues; (ii) improves relations between the police and the public; (iii) increases community trust in the SFS; (iv) improves the implementation of crime prevention and control activities; (v) increases police credibility and legitimacy with communities; (vi) increases positive community attitudes towards the police; (vii) improves communities' sense of security; (viii) increases the information citizens provide the police.

The main benefit of community policing is its capacity to provide news (32%) and intelligence (12%), which are fundamental to the early detection of criminal phenomena and the referral of at-risk individuals.

On the other hand, the fact that this type of proximity policing is implemented across a large part of the national territory allows for greater community engagement (20%) in solving their own security problems, which in turn increases public trust in the SFS, whose knowledge of the communities also increases, along with the possibility of detecting technical evidence of criminal practices (this was mentioned by 16% of respondents).

These answers are supported by the theoretical review carried out for this work. The OSCE (2014) and Segrave and Ratcliffe (2004) state that community policing improves the sense of security within communities, improves police-citizen relations (making it easier to conduct crime prevention and control activities), and increases the information (in terms of quantity, quality and diversity) that is voluntarily provided by members of the community in support of police action.

The vast majority of respondents (86%) agree that community policing is an appropriate approach to prevent radicalisation. Community policing contributes to terrorism prevention in several ways. Therefore, it is worth emphasising that community policing increases resilience in communities and improves relations between police and isolated individuals and groups at risk of radicalisation (Edwards, Jeffray, & Pantucci, 2015), and may prevent them from becoming radicalised. Furthermore, community policing builds trust between the public and the police, which will result in greater access to critical information that can help identify signs of radicalisation within communities (Lyons, 2002).

However, two respondents had different opinions: Ramos (email interview, 11 February 2019) states that "community policing alone does not achieve any goals… and detecting radicalisation phenomena can be done with the current proximity model or through traditional uniformed / plain clothes policing"; Silva (op. cit.) states that "Community Policing does not work in these cases", arguing that this model of policing is ill-suited to communities governed by "parallel rules" to those of the dominant society.

Most experts agree that a specific community policing programme to prevent radicalisation is not required. Ramos (op. Cit.), Guinote (email interview, 12 February 2019) and Bolas (email interview, 12 February 2019) argue that the dimension of the phenomenon and the threat level do not justify the creation of a specific programme in this area. Soares (op. Cit.) does not consider it necessary or desirable to create a specific programme, arguing that that training should be given to those already performing community policing functions. Bessa (op. Cit.) warns that "individualising the phenomenon can have a negative impact and actually advertise the problem to vulnerable people / communities who would have been unaware of it otherwise."

However, it is worth mentioning some examples of best practices that can be used to assess the appropriateness of a specific community policing programme aimed at preventing radicalisation: the first example is the establishment of the community liaison section of the Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in 2008, which led to the development of a comprehensive programme to engage Muslim communities in issues relating to violent extremism (the programme has had excellent results, and has been included in a list of OSCE best practices) (Neumann, 2017); the second example is the National Diversity and Integration Unit of the Irish National Police, which maintains regular contacts with the Muslim community and makes efforts to build a relationship of trust with members of that community, which makes them more likely to report issues that could endanger the Muslim community. This means that police liaison officers might receive intelligence that can be used to prevent individuals from becoming radicalised (EC, 2019).

The benefits of community policing are the news and intelligence that it can provide the SFS, especially from communities that are traditionally more resistant and distrustful of state authorities and from whom it is extremely difficult to extract police intelligence, which is essential to identify and report dangerous or suspicious activities and to prevent the occurrence of criminal phenomena.

4.5. How the GNR can help prevent jihadist radicalisation in Portugal through community policing

In light of the above, the answer to the RQ – "How can the GNR prevent jihadist radicalisation in Portugal through community policing?" – is that the territory covered by the GNR, its wide range of tasks, and the partnerships that it is able to set up with communities through the community policing model make it uniquely qualified to gather and produce intelligence, which is fundamental to identify the signs of suspicious activity. By increasing trust between citizens and GNR officers, community policing allows these officers to work

within the communities, including isolated ones, and gain access to large amounts of information that is used to monitor crime every day. Thus, focusing the collection effort on terrorism and radicalisation can generate information that might lead to the detection and referral of specific cases of radicalisation. However, officers must be trained to handle this sensitive issue so that they can recognise the early warning signs and know how to address to them to prevent someone from taking the first step towards radicalisation. The GNR has built strong links with the community through various Special Proximity Policing Programmes (SPPP) such as the "Safe School" programme, which allow it to detect early warning signs of radicalisation, to acquire intelligence on radicalisation phenomena, and intervene with at-risk individuals before it is too late. However, this investigation found that expert opinions are divided regarding the need for a specific community policing programme focused on preventing radicalisation.Conclusions

Radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist groups is a current global security problem of vital importance, and there have been several cases of radicalisation of foreign fighters by Daesh, including Portuguese citizens. Combatting radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism is a relevant, current and pressing concern for the EU and its Member States.

Thus, the GO of the present investigation was "*To analyse how the GNR can prevent jihadist radicalisation in Portugal through community policing*", and the study was delimited: in terms of time, to the period after 11 September 2001 until the present day; in terms of space, to the Portuguese territory; in terms of content, to the role of the GNR in the Portuguese NSS and the community policing it carries out in the national territory.

The study was guided by the RQ, "*How can the GNR help prevent jihadist radicalisation through community policing?*", and by four SQ.

The methodological procedure used in the study was inductive reasoning, a qualitative research strategy and a case study research design (Santos & Lima, 2016, p.20). The data were collected by analysing published studies and reflections, the applicable legislation, and strategic documents issued at EU and national level – which served to clarify concepts related to radicalisation prevention and community policing –, in addition to fourteen semi-structured interviews with experts with vast professional, academic and technical expertise in Terrorism and Community Policing.

The study was organized in five sections, which present the conceptual framework of the investigation, describe the analysis model and the research methodology, and, finally, present and discuss the study's findings.

SO1, *To analyse the GNR's role in preventing terrorism as part of the Portuguese National Security System*, was achieved by answering the corresponding SQ1, which was operationalised by analysing the current Portuguese NSS and the legal documents that govern it. It was found that the GNR, as part of the NSS and due to its presence in the national territory, plays a fundamental role in the prevention of terrorism for its capacity to collect intelligence on this phenomenon.

As for SO2, *To analyse how jihadist radicalisation processes develop in the West*, the corresponding SQ2 was answered by analysing theoretical radicalisation models. It was found that the radicalisation process is complex, that it is influenced by multiple causes and

factors, and that it varies from person to person, making it impossible to build a credible profile of individuals who are more likely to become radicalised.

To achieve SO3, *To examine the European Union's jihadist radicalisation prevention programmes*, the corresponding SQ3 was answered by analysing two important programmes in this area (RAN POL and the CoPPRa Programme), which focus on the role of the SFS in preventing radicalisation through the community policing model. It was found that Portugal does not have a radicalisation prevention programme and that experts' opinions are divided regarding the adoption of a radicalisation prevention programme designed specifically for the Portuguese Security Forces.

SO4, *To analyse the role of community policing in preventing criminal phenomena among minorities*, was achieved by answering SQ4. It was found that community policing is an important tool to acquire news and intelligence that can be used by the SFS, which is essential to identify and report dangerous or suspicious activities, thereby preventing the occurrence of criminal phenomena.

The above analysis achieved the study's GO, which was to determine that the GNR can help to prevent jihadist radicalisation through the community policing model by detecting early warning signs and specific cases of radicalisation. The GNR plays a key role in the prevention of jihadist radicalisation. It does so thanks to its considerable presence in the national territory, to the fact that it is qualified to carry out terrorism prevention activities, and to the community policing model it has adopted. This model increases the trust between the GNR's officers and the communities they patrol, allows them to set up partnerships, and increases the likelihood of citizens providing intelligence to the police. Therefore, through community policing, the GNR has access to large amounts of information, which is used on a daily basis to control and prevent criminal phenomena and is essential to detect and report specific cases of radicalization and intervene with at-risk individuals before it is too late, thus contributing to prevent radicalisation.

Finally, this investigation's main *contribution to knowledge* is the suggestion that the community policing model implemented by the GNR, which is based on the SPPP, be adapted to include greater participation by the community in preventing outbreaks of radicalism and violent extremism. The model should be integrated into the existing policing system and adapted to the national reality, drawing on the lessons learned by other countries, because individualising the phenomenon can have a negative impact and actually advertise an issue that has not yet become urgent.

A *limitation* of this study was that it was not possible to obtain answers from all the experts and scholars who were sent the interview questions. Because there are few experts on this issue, the number of requests that they receive does not always allow them to answer this type of survey, which reduced the analysis sample. Another limitation was that it was not possible to interview foreign experts on terrorism and community policing.

Finally, *future studies* could analyse specific radicalisation prevention models and broaden the research scope to cover vulnerable communities such as the Islamic community, and to set up partnerships with those communities to define an appropriate model adapted to the Portuguese reality.

Therefore, it is *recommended* that the GNR conduct a study in coordination with European law enforcement agencies to assess the need for a specific radicalisation prevention programme to be implemented in Europe, as well as specific training programmes to help police officers interpret what they see and hear in their communities so that they can detect the signs of radicalisation phenomena.

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